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Settlements and Waivers Affectine
Pension Benefits Under ERISA
Eric D. Chason

Waivers affecting pension benefits may be entered into as part of
a controversy (for example, a settlement agreement) or in isolation (for example, a disclaimer). Under current law, bowever, it is
unclear bow tbese waivers fit witbin tbe protections of ERISA,
particularly tbe antialienation rule. Courts have generally bonored settlement agreements so long as tbey are procedurallyfair to
participants. However, the antialienation rule looms in the background. The IRS and TreasUf)J, in contrast, have focused on
waivers outside tbe settlement context, prohibiting participants
from making tbem but allowing benefiCiaries to do so ifthe waiver
satisfies gift-tax rules for disclaimers. The author critiques tbese
results and suggests that waivers that settle disputes or that Simply
refuse plan benefits moe outside tbe scope oftbe antialienation rule
and sbould be respected

greements that purport to waive or settle claims under ERISA
. raise unique issues, especially for tax-qualified retirement plans.
A primary issue here is the antialienation rule of ERISA. In essence,
the antialienation rule says that retirement benefits can neither be
sold nor made available to creditors of the employee (subject to
some exceptions). Potentially, then, a private settlement of pension
rig'lts could never be enforceable against the employee. For example, suppose Employer A and Employee B disagree over Employee B's pension benefit, with A saying it is ~1,200 per month and
B saying it is $800. To avoid litigation, they settle, agreeing that B
should receive 51,000 per month. Does this agreement prevent B
from suing A's plan for 51,200 a month? Employee B might say that
he or she was really entitled to 51,200 under As plan and that the
setdement agreement is void as a prohibited alienation.
Courts have generally avoided this issue and accepted settlement
agreements affecting pension benefits with some reservations. Some
courts have suggested that it would matter whether B was "entitled"
to $1,200 or whether B was simply "claiming" Sl,200. What is meant
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by this distinction is unclear. Other courts vie\\~ settlements as being
subject to the antialienation rule while others suggest that settlements
are entirely outside the scope of the antialienation rule.
In contrast, the Internal Re\~enue Selyice and Department of Treasury ha\-e focused on \yaivers in isolation, analyzing them under the
antialienation rule, but also the anticutback rule of LRC Section
411(d)(6) and ERISA Section 204(g) and the vesting rules of LRC Section 411(a) and ERISA Section 203(a). In generaL the agencies have
found that beneficiaries can v,caive pension benefits but participants
cannot. The legal basis for this result, and ti~e policy for the distinction
bem-een participant and beneficiary, are both problematic.
The focus of this article will be on waivers and settlements between the employer (or plan), the participant, and any beneficiary
affecting pre,-iously earned benefits under a pension plan. This article will not focus on waivers affecting participation (that is,
preaccrual) or wai,'ers affecting welfare plans. First. there will be a
brief review of the applicable statutory and regulatory provisions.
Second, there will be a discussion of the case law on waivers. which
typically deal with settlement agreements. Third, there will be a discussion of disclaimers, a creation of the law of trusts and estates and
recognized by the IRS in informal guidance. Finally, there will be a
discussion of all these authorities with the goal of discussing inconsistencies and proposing a general theory of waivers and settlements
affecting pension rights under ERISA.

STATUTORY A.l'JD REGULATORY PROVISIONS
Below is a brief discussion of four major ERISA protections implicated by \';aivers and settlements. They are d1e antialienation rule
of ERISA Section 206(d)(1) and LR.C. Section 40 1(a)(13)(A): the written plan document rule of ERISA Section 402(a)(1): the anticutback rule
of ERISA Section 204(g) and I.R.c. Section 411(d)(6); and the nonfotfeitability rule of ERISA Section 203(a) and I.RC Section 411 (a).

Antialienation Rule
The antialienation rule is the focus of many decisions dealing
\\'ith \\~ai\-ers and settlements. The antialienation rule says dut benefits under a pension plan "may not be assigned or alienated."
(ERISA §206(d)(1): I.R.c. 401(a)(13)(A).) Treasury regulations indicate that assignments and alienations include arrangements for payment of plan benefits to the employer and third parties. CTreas. Reg.
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§1.401(a)-13(c)(1).) The purpose of the antialienation rule is to prevent participants from spending funds that were set aside for retirement. I The antialienation mle does not apply to welfare benefits.2 It
does, however, apply both to participants and to beneficiaries under
Treas. Reg. Section 1. 401 (a)-l 3(c)(1)(ii).

Written Plan Document Rule
ERISA Section 402(a)(l) says that all ERISA plans must "be established and maintained pursuant to a written instrument." This rule
acts like a Statute of Frauds, protecting participants from secret
amendments. 3 Ko court analyzing ERISA waivers or settlements has
ever treated them as part of the written plan document (for example,
as an amendment to the plan). In addition. no court has ever suggested that plans may not follow waivers and settlements on the
grounds that they are not part of the written plan document. In other
words, ERISA waivers and settlements can be valid even though they
are not part of the written plan document. This may seem like a small
point, but it has important implications for the treatment of waivers
and settlements under the anticutback rule.

Anticutback Rule
Certain rights and benefits under a pension plan may not be
elininated or reduced by plan amendment. These rights are (1) the
accrued benefit under the plan, (2) early retirement benefits and retirement-type subsidies (as defined in Treasury regulations), and
(3) optional fOlllS of benefit under the plan. (ERISA 204(g);
I.R.c. §411(d)(6).)
The Treasury regulations state, "In general ... a participant may
not elect to waive section 411(d)(6) protected benefits." (Treas. Reg.
§411Cd)-4 Q&A 3(a)(3).) By 411(d)(6) protected benefits, the regulations refer to the three types of benefits described in the preceding
paragraph.4 There are ~~o exceptions to this rule in the regulations
dealing with transfers between plans, which have been expanded by
the recent tax act (EGTRR.!\).5 The regulation quoted above could be
interpreted as prohibiting any vvaiver, or even a settlement of pension claims, by a participant. (It is worth noting that the terms of the
regulation do not apply to a beneficiary.) The IRS has reiterated its
position on participant waivers in its manual and in a private ruling. 6
If this regulation were valid, it might well end, or at least greatly shorten, the discussion of waivers relating to pension plans.
BENEFITS LAW JOURNAL

63

VOL. 14, NO.4, WINTER 2001

Settlements and Waivers Affecting Pension Benefits Under ERISA

Howeyer, this regulation probably is invalid. It is black-letter law that
the anticutback rule applies only to plan amendments. One circuit
court has said, "[T]he \vord amendment is used as a word of limitation . . . Congress did not state that any change would trigger [the
anticutback rule]; it stated that any change by amendment would do
so ... In its present form, [the anticutback rule] is specifically limited
to actual amendments."By prohibiting "'.'aivers (which are not amendments) under authority of the anticutback rule (\vhich applies only to amendments),
the regulation is invalid even under the deferential standard of
"manifestly contrary to the statute."8 This standard, however, applies
only to legislative regulations, which are issued under express grants
of regulatory authority.9 There is no general authority to issue legislati\Ce regulations under LRC Section 411(d)(6) and ERISA Section
204(g). As a result, the waiver regulations under I.RC Section
411(d)(6) are probably interpretive regulations and subject to an
even less deferential standard of review, meaning they are upheld
only if they implement the statute in a reasonable manner. IO
Nonf01feitability Rule
A participant's benefit must be nonforfeitable (vested) upon satisfying certain service requirements under ERISA and the Code. (I.RC
§411(a); ERISA §203(a).) The purpose of this rule is to prevent employers from forfeiting penSion benefits in response to termination of
employment or misconduct by the employeeY In its manual and in a
private ruling, the IRS has indicated that 'waivers implicate the
nonforfeitability rules. 12

WAIVERS AND SETTLEMENTS UNDER THE CASE LAW
As discussed in this section, courts have honored settlements and
waivers subject to limitations. 13 However, the limitations vary from
decision to decision. Although there is no recognized split of authority, the cases might be broadly divided between tv.-o lines. One line
views the \-alidity of wai\-ers and settlements as essentially beyond
the scope of the antialienation rule, considering them valid if they
are "knowing and ·voluntary.·· Essentially, these courts ,-iew the validity of waivers and settlements as depending upon the procedure under which they were executed. Another line views the validity of
waivers and settlements as being subject to the antialienation rule,
considering them valid if thev do not result in the alienation of
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"established" pension rights. This division may not neatly apply to
every decision, although it does represent the two main doctrines
that courts apply \v~hen aralyzing waivers and settlements.

Waivers and Settlements Under the
"Knowing and Voluntary" Standard
Courts using the knowing and voluntary standard generally agree
that waivers of pension rights are subject to high scrutiny.14 They also
generally agree that enforceability of waivers is governed by federal
common law. 15 The essence of the inquiry for these courts is whether
the waiver or settlement was "knowing and voluntary" under all of
the facts and circumstances. 16
COutts have developed a list of factors for assistance in determining whether waivers and settlements are knowing and voluntary. The
first court to do so was the Second Circuit in Laniok v. Advisory Committee of Brainerd lVlanujacturing. Company Pension Plan, 935 F.2d
1360 (2d Cir. 1991), which borrowed the following list of factors from
ADEA waiver cases•
•
•
•
•

•

employee's education and business experience;
amount of time the employee had to review the agreement
before signing;
employee's role in deciding terms of the agreement;
clarity of the agreement;
whether the employee had legal representation and
whether the employer encouraged the employee to seek it;
and
whether the consider~tion given in exchange for the
waiver exceeded the employee benefits that the employee
was already entitlec to.

The court in Laniok insisted that the list of factors was simply a
guide, and not a checklist. The court said, "The essential question is
a pragmatic one: whether, in the totality of the circumstances, the
individual's waiver of his right can be characterized as 'knowing and
voluntary."'17 The First Circuit has applied these factors in a somewhat more mechanical manner in lVlorais v. Central Beverage COtp.
UnIOn Employees' Supplemental Retirement Plan, 167 F.3d 709 (1st
Cir. 1999). In lVlorais, the court found that the language of the waiver
agreement can support factors 2 (time to review agreement) and 5
(legal representation). 18 In fact, the court held that plaintiff's extrinsic
BENEFITS LAW JOURNAL
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evidence was inadmissible to establish that these factors were not
satisfied. '9
The decision in Laniok did not implicate the antialienation rule
or the anticutback rule, because it dealt ''.'ith an employee's waiver of
participation in a pension plan upon first being hired. (That is to say,
the employee had nothing to be alienated or cut back at the time.)
However, other courts have approved waivers and settlements under
the Laniok test in 'ways that do implicate the antialienation rule. For
example, the Second Circuit in Finz u'. Schlesinger, 957 F.2d 78 (2d
Cir.), ceniorari denied, 506 C.S. 822 (1992), respected a waiver of
pension benefits by an attorney (Finz). Finz was apparently a shareholder in the firm and claimed he joined the firm in hopes of receiving a "guaranteed pension." Seven years after joining the firm, Finz
demanded information on the pension, which the firm refused to
provide. Finz and the firm settled the dispute by an agreement where
Finz relinquished all rights he may have had to the pension plan.
\"X'ithout even addressing the issue of antialienation,2D the Finz court
seemed content that the severance agreement satisfied the standard
set fonh by Laniok. Similarly, the Seventh Circuit separated the enforceability of settlements from the operation of the antialienation
rule by saying, "[T)he anti-alienation provision protects individuals
who pledge their pension benefits as collateral or squander their
benefits before retirement. .. The Settlement Agreement in this
case does not fall into either category. "21
Rhoades v. Cas~v, 196 F.3d 592 (5th Cir. 1999), certiorari denied, 531
u.s. 924 (2000), is perhaps the clearest case of waiving uncontested
pension entitlements. There. the Fift..~ Circuit respected a bank
executive's waiver of his ESOP benefits. The executive waived the benefit as part of settling an investigation by the Office of Thrift Supervision
and the Texas Savings and Loan Department on the grounds that the
executive may have "committed violations of banking regulations,
breached fiduciary duties, and engaged in unsafe or unsound banking
practices."22 Later, the executive claimed the \\-'aiver was invalid under
the antialienation mle. Citi..'1g Finz, the court noted, "[11he anti-alienation provision of ERISA is not absolute. Courts . . . have noted that
there is an exception to ERISA's anti-alienation provision for a knowing
and voluntary waiver of retirement benefits that is executed to reach a
settlement. "23 The court also suggested that all "voluntary waivers of
pension benefits by a plan participant that are made in exchange for
substantial consideration" are exempt. 24
\'Vhat seems to unite this line of cases is that panicipants can
execute waivers affecting pension rights as long as the waiver is
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knowing and voluntaly. The cases dealing with waivers after the
benefits have (allegedly) accrued might also be read as to require
that the waiver be executed as part of the settlement of a dispute.
That said, the settlement-of-a-dispute element was only tangentially
related to the waiver in Rhoades. There, the participant's dispute was
with bank regulators, not ~with the plan or his employer.

Wa:ivers and Settlements Under the Antialienation Rule
Other cases have focused more sharply on the antialienation rule
in analyzing waivers and settlements. In the view of these courts, a
waiver of pension rights cannot violate the antialienation rule, even if
the waiver satisfies the test in Laniok. Taken to an extreme, however,
this view could invalidate many settlements affecting pension benefits. }...rnbiguities in plan :erms, the law, and the facts can all cause
wide differences in how much benefits a participant is entitled to. If
plan and participant resolve these ambiguities through a settlement,
it is unclear what would keep a participant from bringing the
"se:tled" issues before a court, claiming that the settlement was really
an impermissible alienation.
To prevent this problem, some cases have suggested distinctions
between permissibly settling pension disputes and impermissibly
alienating penSion benefits. For the Seventh Circuit in Licciardi u.
Kropp Forge Divisian Employees' Retire'ment Plan, 990 F.2d 979 (7th
Cir. 1993), Judge Richard Posner wrote:
The basic point is that the release released the defendants from
liability based on contestable pension claims .... [T]he release did not
,vipe out Licciardi's claims to any pension benefits to which the plan
entitled him. If the release were thought broad enough to wipe out
actual pension entitlements, its enforceability would be questionable
in light of ERISA's provision forbidding the alienation of pension
benefits. For then it might be a case of Licciardi's having "sold" his
pension tights, in the rele~cse, in exchange for the 5650,000 and any
other considerati.on in the omnibus agreement. 25

This passage seems to divide issues between those related to "pension entitlements" and "con:estable pension claims." In a subsequent
case, Lynn v. CSX Transporation, 84 F.3d 970, 975 Oth Cir. 1996), the
Se\'enth Circuit tried to make this distinction more clear:
Pension entitlements are, without exception, subject to the antialienation provision of ERISA. Contested pension claims, on the other
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hand, are "simply outside the realm of the provision." The distinction
between these two categories is a critical one, and, if the decision of
the district court is any indication, one that has not yet been drawn
with sufficient clarity. A pension entitlement arises under the terms
of the pension plan itself. A contested pension claim, by contrast,
arises under a settlement agreement. A release may prevent a plan
participant from asserting claims based on a settlement agreement,
but may not bar claims based on pension entitlements. 26

In Lynn, the plaintiff had signed a general release upon terminating employment. He later sued the pension plan of his employer
claiming, among other things, that he should receive credit under the
plan for his military service. The Seventh Circuit held that this claim
was not waived under the general release. The court's rationale was
that the claim v,'as not based upon the release but was based upon
pension entitlements that vvere outside the realm of the release. T
This can be contrasted with LiCCiardi, where the plaintiff asked that
amounts received under a settlement agreement count towards credited earnings under the pension plan. The claim in Licciardi was
barred because it arose under the agreement which contained a general release and did not designate the earnings as counting towards
the plaintiffs pension. As a result, the court viewed the claim as being waived. 28
The Tax Coun has expressly ruled that the 'waiver of an accrued
benefit under a pension plan violates the antialienation rule, even if
the waiver was knowing and voluntary. In Gallade v. Commissioner,
106 T.c. 355(996), the taxpayer owned a company 100 percent and
wanted to have his substantial benefits revert to the company v"hen
he terminated the company's pension plan. The Tax Court disregarded the waiver as violating the antialienation rule, and ruled that
the taxpayer received a deemed distribution from the plan. The
wah'er was not (as other reported cases), part of settling any case or
controversy. Instead, the taxpayer \\'anted his pension to revert to his
company in order to provide funding for the company. A curious
aspect is that Gallade was not dealing with protecting a participant
from squandering his or her pension benefits, which is the purpose
of the antialienation rule. 29
Gallade did not even technically deal with the tax-qualified status of the plan. Instead. it dealt with the tax consequences of the
waiver, and found that the waiving partiCipant was in constructive
receipt of the benefit. The analysis of the Tax Court was essentially
this: (1) the waiver violated the antialienation rule, and (2) therefore
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the taxpayer is taxed under the constructive receipt doctrine. However, the Tax Court never said why (1) leads to (2). Perhaps the
theory was not really invaLd but was rather disregarded for tax purposes. To reconcile the tax treatment (the waiver is disregarded) with
the substantive reality (the corporation, not the taxpayer, has the
money), the Tax Court may have implicitly "expanded" the transaction by deeming the occunence of two steps-taxpayer receives distribution and then contributes it to company. However, this analysis
was altogether unnecessary. This is because the taxpayer's waiver
could have simply been treated as an assignment, and thus a distribution, under 1.R.c. Sectio::) 72(p)(l)(B). As a result, the whole discussion of the validity of waivers in Gallade could be viewed as
obzter dicturn.

DISCLljMERS
A disclaimer is typically thought of as the refusal of a gift or bequest by a beneficiary. Usually, the beneficiary refuses the gift or
bequest, which then passes as if the beneficiary had predeceased the
donor. If the disclaimer meets the requirements of LR.C. Section
2518, then the beneficiary is not subject to gift tax, even though the
beneficiary could have received the property but instead let it pass to
someone else (presumably a person the beneficiary wishes to benefit). It is important to note, however, that disclaimers are not created
by federal law. For the property interest to bypass the beneficiary,
there must be a provision in applicable state law. That said, such
provisions are relatively unifo:TIl across the laws of the various
stares. 30
In G.C.M. 39858 (September 23, 1991), the IRS concluded that a
disclaimer by a beneficiary· does not violate the antialienation rule if
(1) the disclaimer meets the requirements of LR.C. Section 2518 and
(2) the disclaimer meets t~1e requirements of "applicable state law."
In addition, the disclaimer would not result in immediate income
taxation. There was no discussion as to why disclaimers are an exception to LR.C. Section 72(p)(1)(B).
Typically, a disclaimer would meet these requirements if within
nine months of the participant's death the beneficiary delivered a
written refusal of benefits to the plan administrator and personal representative of the deceased participant without previously taking a
distribution. In addition, the disclaimant must not have received any
consideration for making the disclaimer. The IRS gave no opinion
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on disclaimers that fail to meet this standard. There are no cases or regulations dealing with disclaimers of benefits under a ta.x-qualified plan.
The IRS did nm say hmv the state law of disclaimers could be applicable to tax-qualified retirement plans in light of ERISA preemption. The Supreme Court has recently ruled twice that aspects of state
probate hw are preempted by ERISAY Presumably, the preempted
state law of disclaimers could be replaced by plan language allowing
for disclaimers, or a court might recognize some federal common law
of disclaimers that applies to ERISA plans.
Plan language (or federal common 1a\\') would not necessarily
a,,~oid the problem of disclaimers under the antialienation rule. The
,,~hole of the analysis in G.C.;'vL 39858 is the assertion that the rules
governing disclaimers "are generally consistent with the Congressional purpose underlying" the antialienation rule. A disclaimer,
howeyer, can be a complete v,~aiver of all benefits that a beneficiary
has under the plan. It is unclear \vhy the IRS belieyes this is consistent \\'ith the antialienation rule but thinks that a complete \vaiyer of
all benefits by a participant is not.
The G.c.;,vI. is probably sufficient to ease concerns oyer disqualifying a plan by honoring disclaimers. Disclaimers are acknowledged
in proposed regulations under an unrelated Code section, LR.C. Section 401(a)(9). (Prop. Treas. Reg. §1.401(a)(9)-4 Q&A 4.) So, the IRS
has allowed disclaimers but only in a \~ery informal fashion.
Cntil there is more substantial authority on the subject, however,
cautious fiduciaries might choose nor to accept disclaimers out of
concern oyer liability under Title I of ERISA. Kot only is there risk of
liability to the disclaiming beneficiary, but there might also be liability to his or her heirs. For example, suppose a participant names her
second husband as primary beneficiary and her child from a prior
marriage as secondary beneficiary under a 401(k) plan. Palticipam
dies, and second husband disclaims. allowing the account balance to
pass to the child from the prior marriage. The second husband may
have a claim (although unsympathetic) that his disclaimer violated
the antialienation rule. If second husband dies \\'ith surviving children from another marriage. ho~ve\'er, these children might have a
more sympathetic claim that the disclaimer is invalid.
The more curious aspect is the fact that the IRS thinks that a
benefiCiary's '·qualified disclaimer·· satisfying "applicable state la,,/'
(if there is such a thing) satisfies antialienation, amicutback, and
nonforfeitability requirements. On the other hand, the IRS thinks a
palticipant's refusal to receive benefits under a plan violates all of

VOL. 14, No.4, WINTER 2001

70

BENEFITS LAW JOURNAL

Senlements and Waivers Affecting Pension Benefits Under ERISA

these requirements. However, the technical operation of disclaimer
rules could be used to allow a pm1icipant, and not just a beneficiary,
to disclaim an imerest in a pension plan before payments commence. Under the gift tax rules relied on in the G.C.M. 39858, a
disclaimant has nine months after the date of "the transfer creating
the interest in the disclaimant,'32 provided that the disclaimant has
not previously enjoyed the benefits of the property (for example, receil/ed a distribution). The date of the transfer occurs when the transfer is complete for federal gift tax purposes. A transfer to a defined
benefit plan would rarely be considered "complete" under the gift
tax rules because the employer typically has the power to add new
participants. 33 (The transfer may be considered complete to a defined
contribution plan because new participants could not receive benefits from a particular account of a vested participant.) So, at least in
the case of defined benefit plans, a literal application of the disclaimer rules could allow a participant to disclaim an accrued benefit
up to the time tha': benefit payments commence.

A MORE GENERAL THEORY OF W ANERS AND
SETTLEMENTS OF PENSION CLAIMS UNDER ERISA
Cunent law places plans and participants in a difficult position
because it is unclear wha': pension claims can be waived. Case law
has generally dealt with waivers under settlement agreements, focusing on procedural protections and contract interpretation. The best
summary of case law I can provide is that waivers under settlement
agreements are usually respected subject to interpretation of the
agreement and procedural safeguards for participants. However, the
antialienation rule unnecessarily stilts the analysis of the courts.
The IRS and Treasury have dealt with isolated waivers of benefits. They think that waivers by participants are per se impermissible. The only regulation on this was issued under LR.C. Section
411 (d)(6) , which deals oliy with plan amendments. Beneficiaries,
however, can waive death benefits if they do so within nine months
of:he participant's death and do not receive a distribution before
executing the disclaimer,
What Should Be Waivable in the Settlement Context

As noted previously, there are tvvo cunents of cases dealing with
settlement agreements:
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•

•

Some courts (for example, the Seventh Circuit) think there
is a distinction bet\\'een unwaivable "pension entitlements"
and waiFable "contested pension claims." I will call this the
"Contested Claim Position."
Some courts (for example, the Second and Fifth Circuits)
think that any pension benefit can be subject to a "knowing
and voluntary 'Yai,'er" if part of settling a dispute. I will call
this the "Knowing and Voluntary Position."

In this section, I will try to show that the K..f}o"~ing and Voluntary
Position is the better method for analyzing waivers and settlements
arising out of pension disputes.
The primary problem '1.'ith the Contested Claim Position is the
difficult distinction it makes bet,,~een pension entitlements and contested pension claims. It should be noted that the courts making this
distinction (Licciardi and Lynn) did not really apply them to the facts
at hand. Rather, both courts simply said that a settlement agreement
would not create any additional pension benefits by reason of settlement payments unless specified by the agreement. This is a simple
enough rule, seemingly based more on interpreting the settlement
agreement than on applying the antialienation rule. In addition,
these courts maintained that pension claims independent of the
settlement agreement were not waived. Again, this is mere contract
interpretation. (It might also be a good reason for employers to
staple a benefit statement to settlement agreements they reach with
employees before execution.)
Even though Licciardi and L)'1111 can be explained as simple
cases of contract interpretation, the decisions are written in terms of
the antialienation rule. "l;nfonunately, these decisions never really
differentiate between wah'able pension claims and unwaivable pension entitlements. The decisions seem to imply that if the issue is a
subject of the controyersy, it is a pension claim. \y'hile this might lead
to the result I ultimately argue for below, it does not make much
sense. Since virtually anything could be the subject of a controversy,
then virtually anything could be a v.~aivable pension claim.
\\:'hat these courts might be trying to say is parties usually have
controversies O\'er "ambiguous" (vvhich they consider waivable)
claims rather than "clear-cut" entitlements (which they consider
unwai\'able). This analysis has problems of its own. Typically, a pension plan giye the administrator the power to resolve ambiguities,
and the exercise of this power is respected by courts unless it is
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arbitrary' and capricious. 34 This analysis would lead to the conclusion
that settlement agreements can function only as to matters subject to
fiduciarv, discretion. In one sense.' a settlement would not be a
waiver on the merits of the claim, but rather a waiver that the fiduciary was arbitrary and capricious over the final determination. As a
result, a plan could settle only those pension claims that a responsible fiduciary could determine on his or her own.
These problems point toward adopting the Knowing and Voluntar{ Position. The primary advantage of this position is that it relieves
courts of having to make the problematic distinction between "pension entitlements" and "contested pension claims." Whether something is a "pension entitlement" depends on numerous facts,
interpretations of ambiguous or missing facts, legal rules, and interpretations of complex or ambiguous rules. For example, new cases,
sta~utes, or regulations may shed light on prior ambiguities, turning
what were previously ambiguous matters under a settlement into
clear-cut pension entitlements. Essentially, settlement agreements
could bring a final and binding resolution only to factual disputes
(and then only if new clarifying facts were not brought to light).
Under the Knowing and Voluntary Position, a court reviewing a
settlement agreement would (1) determine whether the terms of the
settlement agreement cover the issue at hand and (2) determine
whether the settlement agreement was a knowing and voluntary act
by the participant. It would not need to determine the state of the
facts and law at the time of the settlement or at the time of decision
in order to find out whether the matter was a pension entitlement
and not subject to settlement.
One potential criticism is that an employer could extort a settlement agreement from a participant by acting in bad faiL1}. However,
the cases adopting the knowing and voluntary test do not automatically approve all settlements. Rather, they require that a settlement
agreement be a knowing and voluntary act on the part of the participant. For example, if an employer would not pay benefits to a participant until the participant agreed to a benefit reduction under a
waiver, a court should have no problem looking at those facts and
determining the waiver was not knowing and voluntary. In fact, the
Knowing and Voluntary Position would allow courts to look at numerous factors, including the ones set forth in Laniok. Because of the
ability to settle more issue (legal and factual) and because of the inherent procedural safeguards, the Knowing and Voluntary Position
should be the one adopted by the courts.
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W'hat Should Be Waivable Outside the Settlement Context
The rules on \yai\~ers outside the settlement context can be summarized as follows:
•
•

•

The Tax Court thinks that a \yai\~er of benefits violates the
antialienation rule.
The IRS and Treasury think that a ~waiver of any fIght
coyered by I.R. C. Section 411 (d)(6) by a participant violates
the antialienation, anticutback, and nonforfeitability rules.
The IRS thinks that a waiver of benefits by a beneficiary is
permissible, so long as it satisfies the gift-tax mles under
I.R.c. Section 2518.

\Vai\~ers

of benefits by participants outside of settlements are apparentlv, more limited under current rules. \\'~aivers bv
. beneficiaries are
more liberal so long as they comply \viln the gift-tax rules.
Neither the courts nor the IRS has e\'er addressed disclaimers
by participants in the context of the gift-tax rules. As discussed
above, the gift-tax rules could allow for a disclaimer by a participant.
at least in most defined benefit plans. Fitting along with the
antialienation rule, the disclaimer mles prohibit a disclaimant from
recei\'ing consideration in exchange for making the disclaimer. In
other words, a participant could not sell pension benefits under the
guise of a disclaimer. As noted in G.C.:\L 39858, trust beneficiaries at
common law ",'ere under no obligation to accept trust benefits. Participants should nor be under this obligation as well, if they choose
to refuse benefits,
The disclaimer rules seem to provide a method for palticipants to
decline receipt of plan benefits without implicating the antialienation
rule. Because the disclaimer rules participants could not recei\~e consideration in exchange for their disclaimers, Applying the gift-tax
rules for disclaimers would lead Ie the same result as in Gallade,
where the Tax Court disregarded a \'aiver of pension benefits by the
100 percent owner of a company. In that case, the owner did not
truly waive his benefits, but instead let them pass to his corporation
(presumably for income-tax reasons). Essentially, the owner accepted Ll}e benefits, which is inconsistent with the gift-tax rules. Con\'ersely, the result in Rhoades is consistent with this result. There, a
bank executiye waived his entire benefit, retaining no direct or indirect interest. The Fhfth Circuit approved this wai\~er (although justifying it as a settlement with bank regulators).

VOL. 14,

'0.

4, WINTER 2001

74

BEMFITS LAW JOURNAL

Settlements and Waivers Affecting Pension Benefits Under ERISA

The gift-ta,x model also recognizes the distinction betvveen a refusal
to receive benefits and an alienation or assignment of benefits. A refusal
of trust benefits is allowed under the law of truSTS, as noted by the
G.C.M. If this right to refuse is granted to beneficiaries, and there is no
reason why palticipants should not have it as well. The use of disclaimers by participants may well be inconsistent with current IRS position
ani Treasury regulations, although this is not completely clear.
As noted above, however, the Treasury regulations prohibiting
w~jvers are probably invaJid because they were issued under I.R.C.
Section 411 (d)(6) , which applies only to plan amendments. Even if
the gift-tax model for disclaimers is not recognized, there should be
no bar to waivers of pension rights not covered by the antialienation
rule (for example, optional forms of benefit).

CONCLUSION
With increasing litigation and complexity surrounding pension
issues, plans and their palticipants will increasingly settle their disputes by private agreement. Unfortunately, the current case law is
somewhat unclear on wt.at issues can be settled in light of the
an:ialienation rule, with some courts drawing a difficult distinction
be:ween waivable pension claims and unwaivable pension entitlements. Other courts view pension settlements as being outside the
re~Jm of the antialienation ::ule, and will respect settlement so long as
it is a knowing and voluntary act on the part of the participant. This
seems to be the better view, as it protects the interests of participants
wUle allowing parties to settle without the prospect of it being subject to collateral attack under the antialienation rule.
\Vaiving pension rights outside the settlement conteJ<..'t is more
problematic, with the IRS and Treasmy drawing a sharp distinction
between waivers by participants and by their beneficiaries. On the
one hand, the IRS and Treasury have stretched 1.R.c. Section
4L(d)(6) to the breaking point, using it to prohibit waivers by participants even tho'Jgh the statute applies only to plan amendments.
On the other hand, the IRS has (in a General Counsel Memorandum)
recognized gift-tax disclaimers by beneficiaries as being pelmissible.
The problem with the first view is that the regulation is invalid under
the statute. The problem with the second view is that the General
Counsel Memorandum may be insufficient guidance for fiduciaries to
rely on.
The best solution would be to allow beneficiaries and participants to waive pension benefits so long as the waivers satisfy the
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gift-tax rules for disclaimers. This solution would be consistent \vith
the case law of ERISA waivers and with the la"w of trusts, allmdng
participants and beneficiaries to refuse pension benefits if they so
choose. This solution may need regulation or statute to be implemented. Fiduciaries acting in the ordinary course may then wish to
refuse to recognize disclaimers by participants and beneficiaries out
of concern for potential liability under the currently unsettled rules.
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